The perceived present: What is it and what is it there for? by White, Peter
THEORETICAL REVIEW
The perceived present: What is it, and what is it there for?
Peter A. White1
# The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
It is proposed that the perceived present is not a moment in time, but an information structure comprising an integrated set of
products of perceptual processing. All information in the perceived present carries an informational time marker identifying it as
“present”. This marker is exclusive to information in the perceived present. There are other kinds of time markers, such as
ordinality (“this stimulus occurred before that one”) and duration (“this stimulus lasted for 50 ms”). These are different from the
“present” timemarker and may be attached to information regardless of whether it is in the perceived present or not. It is proposed
that the perceived present is a very short-term and very high-capacity holding area for perceptual information. The maximum
holding time for any given piece of information is ~100 ms: This is affected by the need to balance the value of informational
persistence for further processing against the problem of obsolescence of the information. The main function of the perceived
present is to facilitate access by other specialized, automatic processes.
Keywords Perceived present . Temporal discrimination . Conscious perception . Sensory memory . Perceptual processing
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Abbreviations
ASO after stimulus onset
TOJ temporal order judgment
TJT temporal judgment threshold
SOA stimulus onset asynchrony.
Perceptions seem to have a “now” quality: Ordinarily, we take
it for granted that what we perceive is what is the case or what
is happening now, as if there were zero delay in perception. It
is hard to think of any example of a perception that has a
“past” quality, and, indeed, “perceiving the past” seems al-
most like a contradiction in terms. The “nowness” of percep-
tion is a kind of illusion or, more precisely, an informational
construct of perceptual processing. This paper is about that
construct, which, from this point on, will be termed the “per-
ceived present”: the location in the stream of perceptual and
memorial processing in which it occurs, its temporal resolu-
tion, how the quality of “nowness” is generated, and what
functions the perceived present might have. It will be argued
that the perceived present is an important and neglected topic
in psychology and neuroscience.
Whether or not there is a present moment in the world
outside perception, and whether or not time flows on from
one moment to the next, are both matters of active contention
in philosophy and physics (see, e.g., Al-Khalili, 2012;
Barbour, 1999; Bergson, 1910; Buonomano, 2017; Dainton,
2008; Davies, 1995; Dorato & Wittmann, 2015; Greene,
2004 ; Gruber & Block, 2013; Smar t , 1980 ; D.
Zimmermann, 2011). This paper does not aim to take a posi-
tion on those issues. However, the perceived present, whatev-
er else it may be, cannot be the present moment of physics,
even if there is one. The temporal dimension in the space-time
manifold can be represented as a series of Planck time units,
each defining a single coordinate on that dimension. The du-
ration of a Planck time unit is 10-44 s. To put this in context, the
period of a light wave, the time it takes light to travel one
wavelength, is about 10-15 s (’t Hooft & Vandoren, 2011),
which is 29 orders of magnitude longer than the Planck time.
If there is a present moment in the world, it has a time scale of
one Planck time unit, just because each Planck time unit has a
different coordinate on the temporal dimension. The mini-
mum possible time scale of the perceived present cannot be
anywhere near the Planck time unit. The refractory period for
neurons is about 1 ms, and the upper limit for consecutive
firing in a single neuron is about 800 impulses per second
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(Goldstein, 2014). This places a fundamental limit on local
temporal resolution of signals. Probably the finest temporal
resolution in human sensory systems is found in audition,
where differences in arrival times of sound to the two ears
can be resolved on a scale of microseconds (Grothe, 2003).
For most processing, however, the functional properties of
neurons imply that temporal resolution in the perceived pres-
ent must be on the millisecond time scale. This implies that the
perceived present is not the hypothetical objective present.
Like everything else in perception, it is a construct in the brain.
The perceived present is not defined in terms of its subjec-
tive or introspective qualities, though it is difficult to talk
about the perceived present without seeming to implicate is-
sues of subjectivity, introspection, and consciousness. This
paper is not concerned with the nature of consciousness, either
in general or with specific reference to percepts. It is possible
that much if not all of the perceived present is conscious, and it
is also possible that the perceived present constitutes a respect-
able proportion of all that is conscious. The issue of how the
perceived present is constructed, however, can be addressed
without considering whether the information in question is
conscious or not. Also, the paper is not concerned with per-
ception of the flow of time (see, e.g., Gruber & Block, 2013,
2017). Distinguishing the perceived present from the per-
ceived flow of time is not so easy, because, of course, percep-
tion moves on ceaselessly. Hopefully, this matter will become
clearer as the paper unfolds.
The perceived present: A proposal
It is proposed that the perceived present is an information
structure comprising products of perceptual processing, which
may include low-level and high-level products, integrated into
a coherent body of information. It is a very short-term holding
area for information and has very high capacity. Information is
held in the perceived present for a maximum of ~100 ms,
though holding time may be less than that, depending on pro-
cessing priorities and, probably, decay or interference. From
there it is either lost or transferred to other stores, such as
sensory memory and working memory. Information in the
perceived present is labelled with various kinds of time
markers. All and only information in the perceived present is
labelled with a time marker identifying it as “present” (as
opposed to “past”); it may also be labelled with other kinds
of time markers, such as ordinal temporal relations, that need
not be confined to the perceived present. Any information that
is time-marked as “present” is part of the perceived present for
as long as it carries that label. This may include products of
perceptual processing in any modality including exteroception
such as vision, proprioception (Proske & Gandevia, 2012),
and interoception (Craig, 2009a, b), and also products of other
processes in the brain such as mental simulation (White,
2012). It is proposed that the perceived present has the features
it has because they are adapted for the function of accessibility
to postperceptual automatic processing.
Subsequent sections address the main features of the pro-
posed perceived present: in order, the location of the perceived
present in the stream of perceptual processing, the time mark-
ing of information as “present,” and the proposed function of
the perceived present as a holding area for perceptual prod-
ucts. A more extensive depiction of the perceived present will
be presented toward the end of the paper, in light of the ground
covered along the way.
The perceived present is an integrated,
coherent body of perceptual information
Part of the proposal is that the perceived present is an integrat-
ed, coherent body of perceptual information. This means (i)
that it includes semantic information, such as object individ-
uation and identification, and (ii) that it is not to be identified
with information in any postperceptual store, such as sensory
memory. These two propositions will be addressed in turn.
On the first proposition, that the perceived present includes
categorical and other semantic information, the counterpro-
posal would be that the perceived present, if it exists at all, is
precategorical, lacking semantic information. It is not easy to
disconfirm this counterproposal because it is difficult to obtain
direct evidence about the contents of the perceived present. In
research on perception, participants are commonly asked to
report what they perceived. One problem with this was
discussed by Breitmeyer, Kropfl, and Julesz (1982), in con-
nection with visual sensory memory, but applies equally to the
perceived present. It could be argued that the products of per-
ceptual processing, and the contents of the perceived present,
are precategorical, limited to surface physical features such as
shapes and colours. The task of reporting what is perceived
initiates entry of precategorical perceptual products into
postperceptual processing, where semantic information is
accessed and incorporated, and can then be reported. That
would give the impression that the semantic information was
part of the products of perceptual processing when in fact it
was generated in postperceptual processing. Under that hy-
pothesis, the perceived present, as a set of perceptual products,
would comprise only precategorical information, and reports
are not trustworthy evidence of what was perceived.
Against that, however, is abundant evidence, including
EEG and neuroimaging evidence, that, even from an early
stage, activated categorical and semantic information is in-
volved in perceptual processing, through mechanisms of re-
entrant or recurrent processing, and that much if not all of
perceptual processing can be regarded as an interplay between
incoming information and preexisting informational structures
of various kinds (Bar et al., 2006; Di Lollo, 2012; Di Lollo,
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Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Herzog & Manassi, 2015; Hochstein
& Ahissar, 2002; Kahan & Enns, 2014; Lamme, 2006; Tapia
& Beck, 2014). To the extent that that is the case, semantic
information is integrated into perceptual processing almost, if
not entirely, throughout its course. Indeed, some studies have
found evidence that early, low-level, feedforward processing
does not correlate with perception, and that perception repre-
sents a stage at which reentrant processing has enabled the
emergence of coherent bodies of perceptual information such
as individuated perceptual objects defined by integrated fea-
ture combinations (Di Lollo, 2012; Fahrenfort, Scholte, &
Lamme, 2008).
A relevant example is a study by Wyatte, Curran, and
O’Reilly (2012). They considered the problem of object iden-
tification with input degraded by partial occlusion or low con-
trast. They showed that feedforward processing alone was in-
sufficient to account for performance on object category iden-
tification under such conditions, and that reentrant processing
involving activated categorical information was required. It is
of course possible that further categorical and semantic process-
ing occurs after perceptual processing is complete. A verbal
label for the category, for example, might be activated in
postperceptual processing, thereby enabling a verbal report of
stimulus identity. But the results of the study by Wyatte et al.
(2012), and numerous others, show object identification occur-
ring in perceptual processing as a result of activation of cate-
gorical knowledge. Moreover, effects of reentrant processing
have been reported with latencies as short as 100 ms, further
supporting the contention that perception involves categorical
knowledge from an early stage (e.g., Lamme & Roelfsema,
2000). The evidence concerning the occurrence and time course
of reentrant processing therefore supports the hypothesis that
the contents of the perceived present incorporate categorical
and other semantic information.
The foregoing argument has focussed on vision, but
categorical and semantic information is a feature of the
perceived present in other modalities as well. For example,
as Gibson (1962) noted, when we grasp a mug, the tactile/
haptic percept is of an identified object, not of multiple indi-
vidual and local points of contact on different fingers. This
indicates integration for object identification in haptic infor-
mation across spatially separate sites of stimulation and, again,
semantic information in a coherent, integrated perceptual
representation.
On the second proposition, the counterproposal would be
that the perceived present should be identified with informa-
tion in a short-duration postperceptual store, specifically sen-
sory memory. Sensory memory is a store in which perceptual
information may persist up to a maximum of ~1,000 ms,
though with most decay occurring within 250 ms (Auvray,
Gallace, & Spence, 2011; Bliss, Crane, Mansfield, &
Townsend, 1966; Darwin, Turvey, & Crowder, 1972;
Demkiw & Michaels, 1976; Haber, 1983; Jacob, Breitmeyer,
& Treviño, 2013; Schill & Zetzsche, 1995; Sligte,
Vandenbroucke, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010; Sperling, 1960).
Could the perceived present be identified with information in
sensory memory? One problem for that hypothesis is that,
under laboratory experimental conditions, the decay of infor-
mation in sensory memory can itself be reported. Anecdotally,
Sperling (1960) noted that, on brief presentation of complex
visual stimuli, “observers enigmatically insist that they have
seen more than they can remember afterwards, that is, report
afterwards” (p. 1). The veridicality of that insistence is not the
issue here. The issue is that the decayed information was lo-
cated by the observers in the past, not the present. That is, it is
identified by the observers as the remembered (or forgotten)
past, not the perceived present. Sensory memory is exactly
what it seems to be, a store of information about the recent
past, not the perceived present. More argument against the
hypothesis that the perceived present is a feature of or can
be identified with sensory memory will be presented in the
section titled “Balancing Persistence Against Obsolescence”.
In conclusion to this section, then, it is likely that the hy-
pothesized perceived present is a set of information construct-
ed in perceptual processing, incorporating semantic informa-
tion, such as object individuation and identification, and is not
to be identified with information in sensory memory.
Marking information as “present”
A central claim in the present proposal is that perceptual in-
formation is labelled or marked with different kinds of tempo-
ral information, and that the distinguishing feature of the per-
ceived present is that all and only information in it is marked
as “present”. This marker is inaccurate because the informa-
tion that enters the perceived present is running some way
behind the stimuli that gave rise to it, a matter that will be
further discussed in the next subsection. This very inaccuracy
is part of the reason why the apparent “presentness” of infor-
mation in perception needs to be explained as an informational
construct, not as a feature of objective reality.
The idea of informational time marking is not novel. It has
previously been used to account for perception of simultaneity
in the face of different neural transmission latencies for tactile
stimuli (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992), and for perceptual
phenomena resulting from errors of synchronization for dif-
ferent features of stimuli with different processing latencies
(Nishida & Johnston, 2002; see also Amano, Qi, Terada, &
Nishida, 2016; Arstila, 2015; Derichs & Zimmermann, 2016;
Moutoussis, 2012; Zeki, 2015). The most recent version of a
time-marker hypothesis is a proposal by Herzog, Kammer,
and Scharnowski (2016) that stimuli have duration labels at-
tached to them. They argued that a stimulus with a duration of
50 ms does not result in a conscious percept of a 50-ms stim-
ulus, but in a conscious percept with a duration label that
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indicates that it lasted for 50ms. As Herzog et al. (2016) put it,
“The stimulus is not perceived during the 50 ms when it is
presented. The stimulus is even not perceived for a duration of
50 ms. Its duration is just encoded as a “number” (p. 5).
According to Herzog et al. (2016), perceptual processing is
nonconscious, and percepts emerge into consciousness with a
latency of ~400ms. Durationmarking occurs during the initial
400 ms of nonconscious processing, so the conscious percept
emerges with the duration marker attached to it.
The present proposal takes time marking further. The per-
ceived present is itself a construction of time markers: not
duration markers (though those are there as well), but time
of occurrence markers. Thus, when a product of perception
emerges, it emerges with a time of occurrence marker saying
that it is occurring (in the outside world) now. All information
in the perceived present is time marked as “present” and that,
more than anything else, is what makes the information struc-
ture the perceived present. When information exits from the
perceived present, if it is not lost, it is marked as “past” (by
some amount of time). Given that information about “present”
and past co-exist in the system at any given time, something is
needed to differentiate them and to locate individual items in
the stream of recent history as represented in perception and
memory. Time marking has that function. Time marking as
“present” solves two problems for defining and identifying a
perceived present, the problem of variable processing laten-
cies and the problem of varying temporal judgment thresh-
olds. These will be addressed in turn.
Time marking and variable processing latencies
There is now convergent evidence from multiple lines of re-
search that the earliest emergence of a reportable visual per-
cept is about 130–150 ms after stimulus onset (ASO;
Anderson, Pederson, Sandberg, & Overgaard, 2016;
Bagattini, Mazzi, & Savazzi, 2015; Koivisto & Revonsuo,
2010; Madec et al., 2016; Rossion & Caharel, 2011; Rutiku
& Bachmann, 2017; Sandberg et al., 2013; Shafto & Pitts,
2015; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996).1 That is already a prob-
lem because it implies that the perceived present is out of date
by at least that amount of time. But many products of percep-
tual processing emerge with longer latencies than that. Some
examples will be given to illustrate the range. In the case of
face processing, Keyes, Brady, Reilly, and Foxe (2010) found
differentiation between faces of friends and strangers around
250 ms ASO, but not earlier than that. Kiss and Eimer (2008)
found differentiation between fearful and neutral faces around
400–600-ms ASO. Itier, Alain, Kovacevic, and McIntosh
(2007) found differentiation between direct and averted gaze
around 420–580 ms ASO. Construction of a perceptual map
of the layout of the external world takes between 300 ms and
1,000 ms (Yoshimoto, Uchida-Ota, & Takeuchi, 2014; E.
Zimmermann, Morrone, & Burr, 2014). Motion detection un-
der conditions of noise can take as long as 3,000 ms (Burr &
Santoro, 2001; Neri, Morrone, & Burr, 1998). In short, pro-
cessing latencies for reportable visual percepts have a mini-
mum of ~130 ms and vary on a time scale up to hundreds of
milliseconds, if not more.
How can the products of processes with such variable la-
tencies all be perceived as “present”? The answer is that when-
ever a product of perceptual processing emerges, it is entered
into the perceived present and time marked as “present”.
When a product of perceptual processing emerges, it does
not emerge with an informational indication of its processing
latency. That would result in a perceived present that was not a
perceived present at all, but a perceived past with a disorga-
nized mix of different time referents. One aim of perceptual
processing is to construct a synchronized model of the world,
a coherent and unified representation of stimuli in their proper
temporal relations. Time marking newly emerged perceptual
products as “present” contributes to that. The “present”mark-
er is transitory. The fate of perceptual information and its time
marking, and the transitoriness of the “present” marker, will
be further elucidated in the section titled “Balancing
Persistence Against Obsolescence”.
The previous paragraph is not meant to imply that differ-
ences in processing latencies are ignored in perception. There
is evidence for attempts at compensation for differing process-
ing latencies in the form of synchronization mechanisms. For
example, there is evidence for cross-modal synchronization
on time scales up to and even beyond 200 ms (Chen &
Vroomen, 2013; Diederich & Colonius, 2015; Dixon &
Spitz, 1980; Donohue, Woldorff, & Mitroff, 2010; Eg &
Behne, 2015; Freeman et al., 2013; Love, Petrini, Cheng, &
Pollick, 2013; Mégevand, Molholm, Nayak, & Foxe, 2013;
Petrini et al., 2009; Van Wassenhove, Grant, & Poeppel,
2007). With repeated sequences of audiovisual stimuli with
fixed delays between the event in one modality and that in the
other, the brain gradually recalibrates so that the two events
are perceived as simultaneous, and this too can happen on a
time scale of 200 ms or more (Chen & Vroomen, 2013;
Fujisaki, Shimojo, Kashino, & Nishida, 2004; Heron,
Roach, Whitaker, & Hanson, 2010; Parsons, Novich, &
Eagleman, 2013; Roach, Heron, Whitaker, & McGraw,
2011; Rohde, Greiner, & Ernst, 2014; Vroomen, Keetels, de
Gelder, & Bertelson, 2004). Those processes, however, do not
generate a “present” time marker, but only markers that iden-
tify two events as simultaneous. They could be identified as
simultaneous and as occurring in the past. Time marking as
“present”, therefore, is different from time marking as
“simultaneous”.
1 This conflicts with the evidence for latency to conscious perception of
~400 ms reported by Herzog et al. (2016). At present, it is not clear how this
conflict can be resolved (see, e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010; Rutiku &
Bachmann, 2017).
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Synchronization is not necessarily either accurate or uni-
versal in perception, and substantial perceptual asynchrony
may go uncorrected (Arnold, Clifford, & Wenderoth, 2001;
Dixon & Spitz, 1980; Durgin & Sternberg, 2002; Freeman
et al., 2013; Halliday & Mingay, 1964; Ipser et al., 2017;
Vroomen & Keetels, 2010). But, arguably, the very imperfec-
tions in synchronization support the “present” marking hy-
pothesis. Marking all products of perceptual processing as
“present”when they emerge, regardless of errors in or absence
of synchronisation, smooths over temporal incoherence in per-
ceptual information. Thus, time marking as present gives tem-
poral coherence to sets of perceptual information that are gen-
erated with different latencies, just as integration of features
gives spatial coherence to an individuated perceptual object.
Different kinds of time markers: The past
within the present
It might be thought that the time scale of the perceived present
corresponds to the minimum temporal detection or discrimi-
nation threshold in perception: that the minimum time differ-
ence at which one stimulus can be perceived as occurring
before another marks the time scale of the perceived present.
In this section, it will be argued that this is not correct on the
grounds that there are different kinds of time markers.
There have been many studies of minimum thresholds for
judgment that two stimuli are temporally differentiated. Kinds
of judgment include judgment that two stimuli were or were
not simultaneous (nonsimultaneity judgment), judgment that
there was or was not a temporal gap or discontinuity in a
stimulus (gap judgment), and judgment that two stimuli oc-
curred in a particular temporal order (temporal order judg-
ment; TOJ). The collective term “temporal judgment thresh-
old” (TJT) will be used for these, encompassing both detec-
tion and discrimination judgments.
A recent survey (White, 2018)2 has shown a great range of
TJTs in studies of within-modality stimuli in the visual, audi-
tory, and somatosensory modalities. Reported TJTs range
from less than 1 ms (e.g., Henning & Gaskell, 1981; Zera &
Green, 1993) to more than 100 ms (e.g., Fink, Ulbrich,
Churan, & Wittmann, 2006; Marks et al., 1982). Many more
thresholds fall between those extremes, and there is no
obvious peak in the distribution. It is likely that the shortest
TJTs do not indicate true temporal differentiation because
there is evidence that judgments were made using
nontemporal cues. To illustrate, Henning and Gaskell (1981)
found a region of accurate TOJ for brief auditory stimuli with
a gap of around 0.2 ms. However, the judgment was based on
resemblance to different allophones of a consonant, not on
detection of temporal order. What, then, is the shortest TJT
at which there is compelling evidence for genuine temporal
differentiation in perception? White (2018) concluded that
such evidence could be found in studies reporting thresholds
around 18–20 ms (e.g., Brown & Sainsbury, 2000; Craig &
Baihua, 1990; Eimer & Grubert, 2015; Fink, Churan, &
Wittmann, 2005; Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961; Nicholls, 1994;
Stevens & Weaver, 2005; Tadin, Lappin, Blake, & Glasser,
2010). The true minimum could still be less than that, but
evidence for that possibility is not compelling at present. It
could be argued, therefore, that the perceived present has a
minimum temporal resolution of ~20 ms. This is not meant to
imply that the perceived present proceeds in units of 20 ms, or
that the perceived present comprises frames of perceptual in-
formation updated at intervals of 20 ms. It means only that
stimuli have to be separated by ~20 ms before they are per-
ceived as occurring at different times. This could be regarded
as a fundamental level of temporal granularity in perceptual
information, with two caveats: (i) that a shorter minimum is
still a possibility, and (ii) that the minimum could differ be-
tween modalities.
That seems to imply that the time scale of, and the persis-
tence of information in, the perceived present is 20 ms, if not
less. Yet it is proposed here that the persistence or holding time
of information in the perceived present can be as much as
~100 ms. How can those different values be reconciled? The
explanation is that they are just different things.
There could be several kinds of time markers. For present
purposes it suffices to consider three: ordinal time markers,
duration time markers, and time marking as “present”. Time
marking as “present” is exclusive to the perceived present:
when and only when a piece of information is in the perceived
present, it is marked as “present”. This differentiates marking
as “present” from all other kinds of time markers. A time
marker of ordinality (including contemporaneity) can be at-
tached to information about a stimulus at any point in process-
ing, and it can be attached to that piece of information regard-
less of whether it is in the perceived present or not. If the piece
of information leaves the perceived present and enters sensory
memory or working memory, the ordinal time marker can still
be attached to it there, but the marker of it as “present” is
deleted. The same applies to a duration marker. If, as in the
example from Herzog et al. (2016), a piece of information is
labelled as a stimulus that lasted for 50 ms, that label can be
attached to the piece of information before it enters the per-
ceived present, while it is there, and after it has moved on to
another store (if it does).
The possible minimum temporal resolution of 20msmeans
just that one stimulus can be time marked as occurring after
another if they are separated in time by at least 20ms, and they
cannot be so marked (or at least not with any guarantee of
accuracy) if they are separated in time by less than that.
Suppose two stimuli that are separated in time by 30 ms and
are labelled as ordinally related. Information about the first
stimulus enters the perceived present and is marked as2 Copies of this paper are available from the author on request.
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“present”. After a short interval, information about the second
stimulus enters the perceived present and is also marked as
“present”. At that point, both stimuli are marked as “present”,
but they are also marked as ordinally related in time: The first
one is marked as occurring before the second. Thus, informa-
tion about the first stimulus may be time marked as “present”
because it is in the perceived present even though it is also
perceived as preceding the second stimulus in time (and there-
fore, arguably, as in the past). Because the “present” marker
and the ordinality marker are semantically distinct, there is no
contradiction between them. In any case, a contradiction could
only be registered if there was a process that took in both kinds
of information and compared them, and any conflict such a
process might detect would be very short lived. In the example
considered here, the situation can persist only for up to ~70
ms. After that point, the first stimulus is no longer in the
perceived present. If it survives (for example, in sensory mem-
ory), then it may still be labelled as ordinally related to the
second stimulus, but it is no longer labelled as “present”. If
two stimuli are perceived as more than 100 ms apart, then
information about the two will not be in the perceived present
at the same time, because the information about the earlier one
will have gone from the perceived present before information
about the later one has been entered into it. In such a case, the
possibility of detecting a contradiction would never arise.
In short, the perceived present comprises all and only in-
formation time marked as “present”, and each item of infor-
mation may have other time markers for ordinality and dura-
tion. The minimum TJT threshold merely places limits on
labelling with temporal ordinality markers, and those labels
are independent of the fact that the information is, at a given
moment, also labelled as “present”.
The perceived present as a holding area
for perceptual information
Perceptual processes and products
The perceived present is a set of products of perceptual (and
other) processes. But what is the difference between a process
and a product? In an information-processing model, a process
is an operation that transforms information. The product is
then the transformed information (White, 1988). The product
is, in principle, accessible to other processes, whereas the pro-
cess that generated it is not (Fodor, 1983; Scholl & Tremoulet,
2000). How does that apply to the perceived present? The
problem is that information exists at all stages of perceptual
processing. Even at the earliest low-level processing, with
local processing of edge information, angle information,
low-level motion information, and colour information
(Holcombe, 2009), information is there, being operated on.
The information that is there may be local and not integrated
into coherent structures such as perceptual objects, but that
does not alter the fact that information is as much there at that
early stage as it is in any subsequent processing; and, once
there, it can move on to subsequent processes. It could be
argued, therefore, that products are being generated all
through perceptual processing, not just at the end of it. That
being so, what is the difference between information in the
perceived present and all the information in perceptual pro-
cessing prior to and leading up to the perceived present?
The answer to be proposed to that question starts to take us
in the direction of elucidating the function of the perceived
present. If it is there, it has a job to do, and its characteristics
and features relate to the job that it does. It is proposed that the
perceived present is a holding area for perceptual information.
That is, what differentiates information in the perceived pres-
ent from information at earlier stages of perceptual processing
is that it is held as it is for a short period of time; that opera-
tions that transform it have ceased, at least temporarily. Thus,
the perceived present is a body of information that is orga-
nized, synchronized, integrated, and markedwith indicators of
temporality, and it is neurologically active, but not at the mo-
ment being transformed in any way: It is just held as it is for
some minimum amount of time. The perceived present is, in
effect, a very short-term and very large capacity store or buffer
for perceptual information.3 It is the holding of information
that makes that information a product. Information does not
naturally persist as physical objects do: It has to be made to do
so by persistence or recurrence of neural activation. The per-
ceived present is the enforced persistence of perceptual infor-
mation. The distinction between process and product, then, is
that process involves active construction or transformation or
use of information, whereas product involves information be-
ing held as it is for some minimum amount of time.
The usual function of holding information in a store is
availability to further processing. This has been proposed,
for example, as part of global workspace hypotheses (Baars,
1988, 1997, 2002; Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene, 2014;
Dehaene, Charles, King, & Marti, 2014; Dehaene &
Naccache, 2001). The term “global workspace” (Baars,
1988) or “global neuronal workspace” (Dehaene &
Naccache, 2001) refers to a kind of central information ex-
change in the brain, subject to the limited capacity of working
memory, but serving as a hub for the flow of information to or
between specialized processors. The perceived present serves
a similar function: There is no point in holding information if
it is not to be potentially available to subsequent processing
3 Interestingly, a buffer on the time scale of temporal integration in perceptual
processing has also been proposed by Rüter, Marcille, Sprekeler, Gerstner, and
Herzog (2012) as a component in a two-stagemodel of rapid decision-making.
The duration of information storage in the buffer was not specified by the
authors, but would have to be on the millisecond time scale. In the present
proposal, there is one buffer for the entire perceived present, but the possibility
of multiple buffers for specific processing functions should not be discounted.
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(Cleeremans, 2011; Farah, 1984; Fazekas & Overgaard,
2018). The kind of processing to which information in the
perceived present might be available is a matter of conjecture.
Global workspace hypotheses generally suppose that informa-
tion in working memory is available to limited capacity higher
cognitive processes (Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Naccache,
2001). The perceived present has a much higher capacity than
the hypothesized global workspace and a much shorter dura-
tion, as will be shown in the section titled “Evidence for the
Holding Area Proposal”. This indicates that information in it
is likely to be used by rapid, high capacity automatic process-
es. One possibility is that there may be specialized “read-off”
mechanisms that selectively access particular kinds of infor-
mation and generate a judgment that requires minimal further
processing. One possible example, exploiting the high capac-
ity of the perceived present, would be a sample-size estimate,
where a rapid scan of items simultaneously in the perceived
present would automatically generate a quick and rough esti-
mate of numerosity (Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, &
Tsivkin, 1999; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004).
Another possibility is transformation of information into other
representational formats, such as linguistic format (e.g., for
describing tastes, musical sounds, etc.). It is likely that much
of the information in the perceived present is lost without
entering further stores or processing, because of processing
bottlenecks (Jacob et al., 2013; Öğmen, Ekiz, Huynh,
Bedell, & Tripathy, 2013; Sperling, 1960) or interference from
subsequent information input. Greene (2016) commented that
the results of a study by Keysers, Xiao, Földiák, and Perrett
(2001) suggested that “the information provided by a brief
display can be compartmentalized and buffered against inter-
ference from information that follows as soon as 14 ms later”
(p. 222). The perceived present could have just such a func-
tion. Availability allows selectivity: Some information is se-
lectively attended to and further processed or stored, in accor-
dance with prevailing priorities. By “stored” I mean that it
crosses a bottleneck to further stores where it can be retained
for longer, such as sensory memory and working memory.
Having much information available increases the likelihood
that what is needed can be found there.
Balancing persistence against obsolescence
The effective minimum time that information spends in the
holding area would be the minimum required for availability
to further processing for that information to be significantly
enhanced. This has to be balanced against updating of infor-
mation: Information in the holding area that is not updated is
liable to become obsolete, and there is then a need for it to be
modified or replaced with the most recent available informa-
tion. New products of perceptual processing are being gener-
ated all the time and enter the perceived present, potentially
becoming confounded with more out-of-date information that
is already there. If a piece of information becomes out of date
due to some change in stimulus information, then there may
be a need to remove it to minimize conflation or blurring with
the new input. In that case, updating or overwriting may take
priority over persistence.
In that respect, a parallel can be taken with visible persis-
tence. Visible persistence refers to the persistence of surface
visual features of a stimulus at retinal and cortical levels be-
yond termination of the stimulus (Breitmeyer et al., 1982;
Coltheart, 1980; Di Lollo, 1977, 1980; Di Lollo & Bischoff,
1995). For stimuli with durations exceeding 200 ms, visible
persistence can have a duration between 100 and 200 ms
(Coltheart, 1980). With brief stimuli, however, the maximum
duration of visible persistence is ~120 ms and the duration of
visible persistence is inversely related to stimulus duration, so
that it is zero with a stimulus of 120 ms duration (Breitmeyer
et al., 1982; Coltheart, 1980; Di Lollo, 1977, 1980; Di Lollo &
Bischoff, 1995; Efron, 1970; Greene & Visani, 2015; Sakitt,
1976; Yeonan-Kim & Francis, 2019). Why does the duration
of visible persistence vary, and, in particular, why is it inverse-
ly related to stimulus duration?
It has been argued that visible persistence serves the func-
tion of maximizing the time available for visual analysis of the
stimulus (Farrell, 1984). If a stimulus is very brief, say a few
ms, then persistence of low-level analysis of the stimulus fa-
cilitates further (high level) analysis of it. The drawback is
that, particularly when perceiving moving objects, visible per-
sistence would result in motion smear. Farrell (1984) pointed
out that motion smear is smaller than would be expected given
the duration of visible persistence. She argued that, with vis-
ible persistence of 100 ms, an object moving at 60 mph across
the field of view would generate about 9 feet of motion smear,
more than actually occurs (Bedell, Tong, &Aydin, 2010; Burr,
1980; Marinovic & Arnold, 2013). There is, therefore, a trade-
off between maximizing time available for processing and
minimizing smear. Farrell (1984) found that visible persis-
tence was reduced for a given stimulus when other stimuli
were presented close to it in space or time, supporting the
hypothesis that the visual system adjusts the duration of visi-
ble persistence in accordance with processing priorities. Thus,
the visual system is resolving a conflict between different
functional priorities: preserving stimulus information for fur-
ther analysis matters (Fazekas & Overgaard, 2018), but
preventing interference between the stimulus in question and
other stimuli also matters, so preservation of stimulus infor-
mation is curtailed to avoid that kind of interference when it is
functionally advantageous to do so.
That kind of conflict may be salient, and resolved in a
flexible way, in the perceived present as well. That is, there
may be a maximum duration for any given piece of informa-
tion in the perceived present, but the actual duration could be
shorter depending on changing priorities. In the case of the
perceived present, the advantage of information persistence is
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increased availability to postperceptual processing, not facili-
tation of perceptual processing, because perceptual processing
is (locally) complete when that piece of information enters the
perceived present. That is one respect in which the perceived
present can be distinguished from visible persistence. But the
principle of flexibility in accommodating competing process-
ing priorities is similar. The main function of the perceived
present, then, is to maximize availability of large amounts of
highly processed, recent information about the outside world
to further processing and storage.
Could visible persistence be regarded as an example of the
brief retention of information in the perceived present? In the
extreme case, could the perceived present just be visible per-
sistence (and equivalent phenomena in other modalities)? In
support of this, the maximum duration of visible persistence
and that proposed for the perceived present are similar. Also,
on at least some occasions, a percept of visible persistence is
reportable. An example, apparently known since the time of
Aristotle, is the reportable percept of an arc of light that occurs
when a stick with a burning ember at one end is rotated (Di
Lollo & Bischoff, 1995). The example illustrates the problems
caused by persistence, because whatever lies behind the
persisting image of the ember from the observer’s point of
view is temporarily obscured by it.
On the other hand, there are ways in which the perceived
present can be distinguished from visible persistence. First,
visible persistence is at least partly a phenomenon of retinal
processing (Sakitt, 1976; Yeonan-Kim & Francis, 2019),
which places it well before the perceived present in the
stream of visual processing. Cortical mechanisms are also
involved in visible persistence, but probably at an early stage
of perceptual processing (Coltheart, 1980; Farrell, 1984;
Yeonan-Kim & Francis, 2019). The perceived present, by
contrast, has been shown earlier in this paper to include
products emerging later in perceptual processing. Second,
if the perceived present were just visible persistence, then
there would be no information in the perceived present about
stimuli for which there is no visible persistence. Visible per-
sistence, as we have seen, is inversely related to stimulus
duration, which would have the unlikely consequence that
very brief stimuli with visible persistence of 100 ms would
be represented in the perceived present, whereas longer stim-
uli with durations of ~100 ms and no visible persistence
would not.
Third, and most important, Coltheart (1980) distinguished
visible persistence from informational persistence, with visi-
ble persistence referring purely to visual features of stimuli
and informational persistence referring to semantic features,
as well as occurring on a longer time scale. Because the per-
ceived present is a body of information incorporating semantic
information as well as visual features, this would seem to
separate visible persistence from the perceived present.
Thus, the phenomenal experience of visible persistence of a
stimulus would be a consequence in the perceived present of
the mechanisms that generate visible persistence, which oper-
ate in retinal and early cortical processing. In general, howev-
er, persistence of information in the perceived present is not
the same as visible persistence because of the incorporation of
semantic information in what persists. Therefore, visible per-
sistence may make a contribution to the contents of the per-
ceived present, but the majority of the contents of the per-
ceived present are generated in different ways and by different
mechanisms.
Informational persistence occurs on the time scale of sen-
sory memory, which in vision is up to ~1,000 ms (Coltheart,
1980; Demkiw & Michaels, 1976; Schill & Zetzsche, 1995;
Sperling, 1960). This is far beyond the proposed time scale
of the perceived present. Thus, although the perceived pres-
ent and sensory memory both contain perceptual object rep-
resentations with semantic content, they differ both in time
scale and in capacity, with the perceived present having
greater capacity and shorter time scale. Sensory memory is
separate from the perceived present because, if sensory
memory was just the perceived present with decay of infor-
mation over 1,000 ms, then there would be substantial blur-
ring of information in the perceived present with every
change in information, whether that be because of stimulus
motion or eye movements or new stimuli replacing old ones.
Visual percepts have less blur than would be predicted on the
basis of visible persistence and there is evidence for mecha-
nisms of motion deblurring in perception (Bedell et al., 2010;
Burr, 1980; Marinovic & Arnold, 2013; Scharnowski,
Hermens, Kammer, Öğmen, & Herzog, 2007; Tong, Patel,
& Bedell, 2005; Westerink & Teunissen, 1995). In that case,
given that sensory memory has a far greater time span than
visible persistence, the small amount of blurring that occurs
is not compatible with sensory memory being identified with
the perceived present, or being in the same representational
space as the perceived present. The perceived present is,
therefore, not to be identified with either visible persistence
or sensory memory.
The ~100 ms perceived present and variable
processing latencies
In the present proposal, the maximum persistence of informa-
tion in the perceived present is hypothesised to be ~100 ms.
How can this short persistence can be reconciled with long
and variable processing latencies? Two points need to be
made.
One point is that ~100 ms is the maximum duration of
information in the perceived present after the stimulus that
gave rise to it has changed or terminated (temporarily ignoring
processing latencies for the sake of simplicity). If a stimulus
continues for, say, 500 ms without change, as in presentation
of a photograph of a face, then information about the face can
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persist in the perceived present for 500 + 100 = 600 ms. In
effect, it is updated as continuing to be the same for 500 ms,
and then may persist without further updating for up to 100
ms. The word “updated” is important: What persists in the
perceived present is only a representation of what is the
case now (i.e. the fact that the stimulus is still there, for
example 400 ms after its onset, with the same caveat about
processing latencies). The history of the stimulus is repre-
sented elsewhere, such as in sensory memory or working
memory, and such memorial representations may include
information about stimulus duration. But they are repre-
sentations of the past of the stimulus, not its present. The
duration of updating of information about the stimulus is
500 ms, and 100 ms is the maximum duration of updated
information (without further updating) in the perceived
present. If a stimulus has a duration of 1 ms, then infor-
mation about it can persist in the perceived present for up
to 101 ms (approximately). These are maximum possibil-
ities: Persistence of information may be less than the max-
imum, as discussed in the previous subsection.
The other point is that entry to and persistence of informa-
tion in the perceived present happens when the informational
product of a process emerges. Thus, if temporal integration of
motion information continues for 3,000 ms before an infor-
mational product emerges (Burr & Santoro, 2001), that prod-
uct enters the perceived present at that point and no earlier.
This does not mean that the information is out of date by 3,000
ms. Temporal integration over 3,000 ms can only occur if the
stimulus continues to be presented for at least that long: If the
stimulus terminated after 2,000 ms, then no product of tem-
poral integration would be generated, and motion would not
be perceived. If information input to the temporal integration
process terminated at exactly the time at which the product of
the temporal integration process emerged, then that product
would persist in the perceived present for no more than ~100
ms.
In summary, the duration of persistence of information in
the perceived present is independent of the processing dura-
tions of perceptual processing prior to entry into the perceived
present.
Evidence for the holding area proposal
Is there any evidence for the proposal that the perceived pres-
ent is a brief store of information? There is very little, perhaps
because nobody has been looking for it, but a study by Jacob
et al. (2013) is relevant. They presented a visual prime follow-
ed by another visual stimulus with an onset asynchrony (SOA)
ranging from zero to 2,000 ms. The SOA is an indicator of the
processing time available for the first stimulus before the sec-
ond stimulus is presented. Participants carried out two
reaction-time tasks—a priming task in which they identified
the prime stimulus as one of two possibilities, and a
comparison task in which they judged whether the second
stimulus was same as or different from the first. The study
yielded evidence for three stages of prime stimulus process-
ing. In the first stage, priming effects increased rapidly to a
maximum at SOA = 133 ms, replicating the results of an
earlier study by Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, and
Schwarbach (2003). The second and third stages showed
peaks in the comparison task at SOA = 240 ms, declining to
an asymptotic minimum at 720 ms, and at SOA = 1,200 ms,
declining thereafter.
The first of these three stages is of the most interest here.
Jacob et al. (2013) followed Vorberg et al. (2003) in
interpreting it as showing accumulation of information in a
visuosensory buffer. They also argued that it corresponded
to visible persistence. They interpreted the second peak at
SOA = 240 ms as indicating iconic informational persistence.
Iconic memory is the original name for sensory memory in the
visual modality, and they did also use the term “visuosensory”
(p. 1115) as an alternative to “iconic”, so they were in effect
arguing for the peak at 240 ms as indicating entry to the visual
version of sensory memory. There are two problems with
those interpretations. One is that visible persistence does
not involve accumulation of information. It is the mere
persistence of a visual trace, occurring in both retinal and
early cortical processing, and decays over time. As we
have seen, with brief stimuli, the maximum duration of
visible persistence is ~120 ms and the duration of visible
persistence is inversely related to stimulus duration, so that
it is zero with a stimulus of 120 ms duration. The prime
stimuli used by Jacob et al. (2013) had 13 ms duration, so
visible persistence would be predicted to be about 110 ms.
This would be predicted to yield a peak at SOA = 13 ms
and a decline thereafter. That does not fit with accumula-
tion to a peak at SOA = 133 ms.
The second problem concerns the relationship between vis-
ible persistence and sensory memory. Jacob et al. (2013) ar-
gued that the second stage of processing with a peak at SOA =
240 ms indicated entry to visual sensory memory. If that is the
case, what enters sensory memory cannot be visible persis-
tence because visible persistence has decayed completely by
~120 ms ASO.
The results of the study by Jacob et al. (2013) are better
interpreted in terms of the perceived present. The early rise
to a peak in the priming task at SOA = 133 ms does indeed
indicate accumulation of information about the stimulus in
a buffer, but that information is the accumulating contents
of the perceived present, as products of high-level visual
processing emerge. In the study by Jacob et al., this pro-
cess terminated around 133 ms ASO because the stimuli
were relatively simple, coloured, static geometric shapes
and high-level processing was essentially complete by
133 ms ASO. Also, repeated presentation of the same stim-
uli would speed processing (Bachmann, 1989; Bachmann,
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Luiga, Põder, & Kalev, 2003). But if entry to sensory
memory occurs at SOA = 240 ms, what is happening be-
tween SOA = 133 ms and SOA = 240 ms? One answer is
that perceptual processing continues, but that would imply
a continued accumulation of information and a later first
peak. Another possibility is that the existing information is
simply held, subject to a decay function, for ~100 ms, and
then enters sensory memory. Under that interpretation, the
results indicate a duration for the perceived present of
~100 ms. That is the empirical basis for the proposed max-
imum duration of information in the perceived present. Of
course, this is only one finding and the duration may vary
depending on numerous stimulus presentation factors: The
proposed ~100 ms maximum is just a hypothesis, a target
for experimental tests. Notably, there was a blank field
between the first stimulus and the second, and the paucity
of information in that might facilitate persistence of infor-
mation about the first stimulus. Regardless of whether the
first peak represents the time course of perceptual process-
ing or visible persistence, if the second peak represents
entry to sensory memory, then there is still an interval of
~100 ms between emergence of a perceptual object, which,
as we have seen, occurs around 130–170 ms ASO, and
entry to sensory memory. More information can accumu-
late during that time, as processes with longer latencies
generate products, but the information that emerged after
130–170 ms must be retained (subject to however much
decay occurs) in order to be entered into sensory memory.
It must, therefore, be held in some sort of buffer for that
amount of time. If it is, then that buffer is the perceived
present.
In contrast to the priming task used by Jacob et al.
(2013), Öğmen et al. (2013) used stimuli of multiple ob-
jects in motion and tested ability to report motion direc-
tion of an object cued at the moment of motion offset.
They also found evidence for three information process-
ing bottlenecks that appear to correspond to the three
processing stages identified by Jacob et al. (2013), al-
though their data did not permit latencies for the three
bottlenecks to be assessed. They identified the second
and third stages as sensory memory and visual short-
term memory, corresponding to the identifications of the
second and third stages by Jacob et al. (2013). They iden-
tified the first stage as stimulus encoding, however. This
fits with the hypothesis that the first stage represents ac-
cumulation of processed information in a brief store. So,
the first of the three stages found in both studies has
properties that correspond to those hypothesized for the
perceived present, brief duration, very high capacity, and
temporal location prior to sensory memory. The evidence
does not yet take us deeply into the nature and features of
this brief store, but it is at least consistent with the present
proposal.
Other possible functions for the perceived
present
There are several other possible functions for the perceived
present, and this account is not meant to imply that none of
them could be the case: A multifunctional perceived present is
not unlikely. I shall briefly discuss three possibilities, begin-
ning by largely rejecting the one that might seem most
obvious.
Representing the present
It certainly seems as though the perceived present represents
the present moment, as it has the subjective quality of doing
so: Perception never seems to be about the past. In the present
proposal, however, that impression is a consequence of the
fact that information in the perceived present is time marked
as present, and that is not a valid guide to its actual temporal
location. There are other reasons for thinking that representing
the present is not the primary function of the perceived
present.
It has already been shown that in vision, it takes a minimum
of about ~130 ms for any integrated product of processing to
emerge, and much perceptual information emerges with lon-
ger latencies than that. Even the minimum latency of ~130 ms
is slow compared to some other processes operating on visual
information. Gollisch and Meister (2010) have shown that
much complex processing of visual input occurs at the retina,
including detection of motion and texture, various kinds of
adaptation, including pattern adaptation and contrast adapta-
tion, and summation over multiple neural inputs. Retinal pro-
cessing of moving object stimuli involves a form of anticipa-
tory response that effectively compensates for the latency of
physiological and neurophysiological processes in the retina
(Berry, Brivanlou, Jordan, & Meister, 1999; Palmer, Marre,
Berry, & Bialek, 2015). Low-level cortical visual processing
takes only about 30 ms and is largely complete by 100 ms
ASO (Holcombe, 2009). It has been proposed that the amyg-
dala is involved in detection of threats, and that it receives
information through a fast but crude subcortical route, as well
as through a slower route via cortical processing (LeDoux,
1996; Luo, Holroyd, Jones, Hendler, & Blair, 2007; Morel,
Beaucousin, Perrin, & George, 2012). Luo et al. (2007) found
responsiveness to fearful faces only 20–30 ms ASO, and in
fact they found response in the hypothalamus/thalamus area
only 10–20 ms ASO.
Those findings show that if it really mattered that the per-
ceived present occurred as quickly as possible, then it would
be possible for one to occur with a latency much less than 130
ms. It would not be much like the perceived present that we
actually have, but it could in principle provide gist represen-
tations that would specify enough information for urgent prac-
tical purposes. If there was a need for a perceived present to
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have the minimum possible latency, then there would be one
with a latency much shorter than what appears to be the case.
It is likely, therefore, that richness of information, comprehen-
siveness, perceptual object construction, featural and
spatiotopic integration, and detail of analysis are priorities
for the perceived present, more than speed of processing and
response.
A guide to action
It is reasonable to suppose that the perceived present is impor-
tant for the guidance of action (Fazekas & Overgaard, 2018).
If I want to pick up a pen from my desk, for example, it is
important to have accurate information about the contours of
the pen and its location in my visual environment, to guide an
accurate reaching and grasping action. For that function, high
spatial acuity, exact identification of the object and its features,
and differentiation of it from the rest of the visual world would
obviously confer practical advantages. Interacting with static
features of the environment could, therefore, be facilitated by
a perceived present with the properties proposed here.
Problems arise, however, when interacting with moving ob-
jects. There are two problems: One is that the temporal reso-
lution of information in the perceived present may not be
capable of supporting accurate interventions on moving ob-
jects; the other is that the information in the perceived present
is out of date.
On the temporal resolution problem, it has been shown that
professional sportspeople can time their interception of pro-
jectiles such as cricket balls with a temporal error as small as
2–3 ms, and even nonprofessionals can achieve accuracy to
within 5–6 ms (Brenner & Smeets, 2015; Brenner, van Dam,
Berkhout, & Smeets, 2012; McLeod, McLaughlin, &
Nimmo-Smith, 1985). If the minimum temporal resolution
of information in the perceived present is ~20 ms, it would
not seem to be capable of supporting such accurate timing of
interceptions. Problems associated with motion blurring, as
discussed earlier, would also limit accurate timing of
interceptions.
The likely solution to the temporal resolution problem lies
with the evidence for two neuroanatomical pathways for visu-
al information processing, the dorsal and ventral pathways
(Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983; Ungerleider &
Mishkin, 1982). According to Goodale and Milner (1992)
and Goodale (2014), the dorsal pathway is specialized for
the guidance of interactions with objects and the ventral path-
way is specialized for constructing a visual model of the
world. Action can be guided by perceptual information proc-
essed through the dorsal pathway that seems not to enter the
perceived present (Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey,
1991), and indeed reactive actions can occur on a shorter time
scale than that needed to construct relevant content in the
perceived present (Brenner & Smeets, 1997; Castiello,
Paulignon, & Jeannerod, 1991; Prablanc & Martin, 1992).
There is, therefore, a functional dissociation between the per-
ceived present, at least in vision, and the control and visual
guidance of actions. Goodale and Milner (1992) argued that
the two pathways are not completely separate, and indeed it
would make sense for some degree of functional integration
between the two kinds of visual processing to occur
(Breitmeyer, 2014). However, evidence shows that patients
who have no apparent impairment in perceiving and recogniz-
ing a certain kind of object may be considerably impaired in
their ability to act on it, even when it is stationary (e.g.,
Jakobson, Archibald, Carey, & Goodale, 1991). Conversely,
a patient who is unable to recognize objects and their features
may still be able to interact with them appropriately and
accurately—for example, by producing appropriate gaps be-
tween fingers and thumb when asked to grasp the object
(Goodale et al., 1991; Whitwell, Milner, Cavina-Pratesi,
Byrne, & Goodale, 2013). This double dissociation indicates
that the primary function of the perceived present is not the
guidance of action (Goodale, 2014). It must be supposed that
processing through the dorsal route has functional features
that would support the accuracy in timing that has been
observed.
On the second problem, Nijhawan (2008) calculated that,
with a ballistic projectile moving at 90 mph, if we assume that
it takes about 100 ms for a percept of the projectile to be
constructed, the perceived location of the projectile lags about
13 feet behind its actual location at anymoment (see also Land
& Mcleod, 2000). Nijhawan (2008) proposed a way of com-
pensating for this: The visual system uses the available infor-
mation to construct an extrapolation of the ball’s trajectory
that essentially predicts where it is at the present moment.
Generalizing, the whole of the perceived present would be
an informational extrapolation to the present: Unpredicted
events are fitted in as quickly as possible. It can be argued that
that extrapolation effectively compensates for the inaccuracy
caused by the processing latency, to the extent that it accurate-
ly represents the next 100 ms of the projectile’s trajectory.
Under that argument, the perceived present could be an ex-
trapolation to the present that supports accurate timing of in-
terceptions on moving objects by effectively predicting where
they are in the present in the world outside the brain.
Unfortunately, that kind of extrapolation does not supply
what is needed. The interception of moving objects requires
extrapolation beyond the objective present, to the point in time
when contact will occur or is predicted to occur. The times in
the two extrapolations are different, though they converge as
the moment of interception approaches. It has been found that
contact times of moving objects that are 2,000 ms in the future
can be predicted to an accuracy of 10 ms (Bootsma &
Oudejans, 1993). That is a much longer extrapolation than
would be involved in extrapolating to the present. Thus, when
a cricket ball is bowled to a batsman, in the early stages of the
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ball’s flight, extrapolation to the present would place the ball
some feet ahead of its location in the most recent available
perceptual information but still some distance short of contact,
but the perceptual system is also extrapolating a trajectory to
the anticipated time and location of contact. Both extrapola-
tions may be adjusted as the ball approaches and, as has al-
ready been said, they gradually converge on the time when the
ball is contacted, where they coincide. But they are different.
The hypothesis that extrapolation to the present may be in-
volved in the construction of the perceived present is viable in
its own right, but it does not serve the function of guiding the
interception of moving objects.
To keep everything from being present at once4
In the present account, the perceived present is located at or
near the end of perceptual processing and prior to entry of
information to sensory memory and/or working memory.
Because all of the information in all of those processing stages
is neurologically active, in a sense it is all there “now”. The
main problem with that is that all of it covers or concerns a
considerable span of time, not less thanmany seconds. If all of
it was experienced as “now”, then there would be a huge
conflation of information covering that long span of time.
This will now be discussed.
On the input side, as we have seen, processing takes time,
and the amount of time taken for perceptual products to be
constructed varies over a substantial time scale, most occur-
ring within a few hundred ms ASO, but some extending into
the supra-second time scale (Burr & Santoro, 2001; Neri et al.,
1998). The information that is in the system, in varying stages
of construction, cannot all be designated as “now”—not just
because there is so much of it, but because it reflects input
occurring over that long time span. If we take vision as an
example, even 100 ms of visible persistence is apparently
not acceptable under some circumstances (Farrell, 1984): A
few hundred milliseconds of visible persistence for all percep-
tual information would result in an amount of smearing that
would render the visual world blurred to the point of incoher-
ence and uselessness. This could be addressed by assigning
information to separate buffers, the contents of which do not
interfere with each other, and by allocating timing informa-
tion. Thus, the perceived present could be part of that func-
tional differentiation, a buffer of brief duration where infor-
mation is designated as present, and separate from temporally
prior information in perceptual processing.
On the other side of processing from the perceived present,
there is rapid decay of information through sensory memory,
on a time scale of about 1,000 ms (Demkiw & Michaels,
1976; Haber, 1983; Jacob et al., 2013; Schill & Zetzsche,
1995; Sligte et al., 2010; Sperling, 1960). It could be argued
that the decay of information to an amount much smaller than
that in the perceived present would minimize smear, but the
problem is that the temporal extent of the information is much
greater, 1,000 ms as opposed to approximately 100 ms max-
imum for the perceived present. That would result in a rapidly
fading smear, but over a much greater temporal extent. It
should be emphasized again that the smear would be due to
information from different times being in the same represen-
tational space.
Some idea of the problem can be gained by studying cases
of palinopsia. This has been defined as “the persistence or
recurrence of visual images after the exciting stimulus object
has been removed” (Bender, Feldman, & Sobin, 1968, p.
321). Gersztenkorn and Lee (2015) identified eight categories
of palinopsia. The one most relevant for present purposes is
visual trails (Horton & Trobe, 1999; Ihde-Scholl & Jefferson,
2001). The visual effect is not a smear or a streak but rather a
series of discrete images that persist behind a percept of a
moving object and gradually fade on a time scale of
seconds. Two patients studied by Horton and Trobe (1999)
reported seeing a stream of static images in the wake of a
moving object that they were visually tracking. The visual
trails interfered considerably with ongoing perception. When
motion stopped, “the images collapsed into each other” (p.
530). Visual trailing was specific to perception of some (not
all) moving objects. If it happened for all perceptual informa-
tion, perception would be completely disrupted. Clearly, keep-
ing everything from being present at once (at least on the
subsecond time scale) is important, because the palinopsia
cases illustrate the disabling effects of motion trails (driving
a vehicle was impossible for the patients, for example; Horton
& Trobe, 1999).
So, there is a need for a body of information that has the
temporal specificity of the perceived present. It may indeed be
that one of its functions is to prevent too much perceptual and
memorial information from co-occurring in the same repre-
sentational space. Whatever sensory memory might be, it is a
separate buffer from the perceived present with different time
markers.
Other possible perceived presents
It is easy to imagine a perceived present quite different from
the one we have. A perceived present that had properties sim-
ilar to that of the hypothetical objective present would com-
prise a series of momentary snapshots on a minute time scale,
lacking all historical information, and each obliterated as soon
as the next was constructed. At the other end of the range of
possibilities, consider the patient with akinetopsia described
by Zihl, von Cramon, and Mai (1983). Her reports of her own
4 The section heading is adapted from the statement “time . . . is what keeps
everything from happening at once”, sometimes attributed to the physicist
John Wheeler, but originating in a novella by Ray Cummings (1922).
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experience indicated a visual world that proceeded in a series
of static frames. For example, when pouring tea into a cup,
“the fluid appeared to be frozen, like a glacier” (p. 315) and
she could not judge when to stop pouring because she could
not see the level of fluid in the cup rising towards the brim.
She reported other experiences of a similar character. Spatial
coherence was not lost, and her percepts included semantic
information (she knew what a cup was, for example). After
extensive testing, Zihl et al. concluded that the deficit was
selective to movement vision. The patient retained informa-
tion about the previous frame after it had been replaced by a
new one, and the frames seemed to remain static for an appre-
ciable fraction of a second, if not longer, rather than being
replaced on the millisecond time scale. There seems to have
been no blurring, as would happen if input information was
smeared across the time span of a single long frame. It is as if a
single moment was preserved, and all information between
that and the next one to be preserved was lost, never part of
the perceived present. There is no reason to think that the
patient’s perceived present was directly affected; any effect
on information in it would be a consequence of the motion
perception deficit, and in any case would not generalize to
other kinds of perception or other sensorymodalities. The case
is just being used here as a way of imagining different possible
perceived presents.
Akinetopsia and the varieties of palinopsia discussed earli-
er illustrate the possibility that the perceived present could be
very different from the one we actually have. The perceived
present is as it is for functional reasons. The problems caused
by the disorders help to elucidate the functional adaptation of
the perceived present we have. It is not that there are no other
options.
Although there is other perceptual information—in partic-
ular, information that guides action, such as predator avoid-
ance, through the fast amygdala route, or projectile intercep-
tion, through the dorsal route—it is the perceived present that
seems to anchor us in, even to constitute, the present moment
in the world beyond the senses. That can be explained in terms
of time marking. Information in the perceived present is infor-
mationally marked as “present”. Even two stimuli that are
perceived as nonsimultaneous can both be informationally
marked as “present”; this is not incompatible with a separate
set of markers indicating their temporal order. A time marker
of “present” is a transient feature of a piece of perceptual
information: If the present account is right, it will endure no
longer than 100 ms and then change to a marker indicating
some time in the past, unless the information is lost altogether.
The hypothesis that the most recent perceptually available
information is used to construct a percept that is actually an
extrapolation to the present state of the outside world was
briefly discussed in the section titled “A Guide to Action”,
and there is evidence to support it (Changizi, Hsieh,
Nijhawan, Kanai, & Shimojo, 2008; Nijhawan, 1994, 2008;
Nijhawan & Wu, 2009; Shi & Nijhawan, 2012). The hypoth-
esis is controversial: Alternative explanations have been pro-
posed for some of the findings claimed as supporting the ex-
trapolation to the present hypothesis, and the extrapolation
hypothesis does not seem to be able to explain some findings
(Arstila, 2015; Briscoe, 2010; Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2007;
Hubbard, 2014; Krekelberg & Lappe, 2001; Maus, Khurana,
& Nijhawan, 2010; Purushothaman, Patel, Bedell, & Öğmen,
1998; Vaughn & Eagleman, 2013). Nevertheless, it remains
possible that extrapolation plays an important part in con-
structing the information in the perceived present and com-
pensating for the time delays that occur in doing so.
Whether or not that is the case, extrapolation to the present
is mentioned here mainly to distinguish it from time marking.
In the present proposal, marking information in the perceived
present as “present” occurs regardless of whether or not that
information is the product of an extrapolation process.
Conversely, the hypothesis of extrapolation to the present does
not require that extrapolated information be marked as pres-
ent, and time marking does not appear to have been discussed
in connection with extrapolation to the present. The two hy-
potheses sit comfortably together because it makes sense for
information labelled as “present” to be an extrapolation to the
likely present state of affairs, but they are not necessary
bedfellows.
Summary of proposed features
of the perceived present
This section draws together some of the things that have been
claimed about the perceived present in the foregoing account.
1. The perceived present is not a moment, but a function-
ally definable stage in the processing of perceptual in-
formation. Information enters that stage when perceptual
processing of it has reached an end point. It is a set of
informational products of perceptual processing, where
“products” means that the informational products are
held as they are for some amount of time.
2. Large information capacity. The perceived present is the
earliest processing stage at which information is integrat-
ed into coherent objects and contexts. Information stor-
age capacity, in terms of both number of items, complex-
ity of features of perceptual objects, and integration of
perceptual information into a coherent global represen-
tation (E. Zimmermann et al., 2014) is high in the per-
ceived present. The information bottlenecks identified in
the studies by Öğmen et al. (2013) and Jacob et al.
(2013) indicate that subsequent processing stages, in-
cluding sensory memory and working memory, are sub-
ject to progressive reduction in capacity. Capacity in
working memory is usually defined in terms of number
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of discrete items (Cowan, 2001; Joseph, Teki, Kumar,
Husain, & Griffiths, 2016; Schurgin, 2018), and some
kinds of information may be more likely to enter work-
ing memory than others (Sachs, 1967), but capacity in
the perceived present refers to the whole integrated col-
lection of featural, object, and contextual information.
3. Subjective coherence and organization of information.
The contents of the perceived present appear to cohere
as an organized representation of what is out there, in-
cluding such things as object individuation and binding,
cross-modal synchronization and integration, and some
kind of map of the perceived world (E. Zimmermann
et al., 2014). The term “subjective” is used because there
is probably some degree of local independence, with
different pieces of information brought together and in-
tegrated when need be (e.g., Hogendoorn, Verstraten, &
Johnston, 2010).
4. Capacity to represent information with temporal resolu-
tion on the millisecond time scale, down to at least 20ms
and possibly less.
5. Temporal integration. Specifically, the perceived present
is not like a photograph in presenting an isolated mo-
ment: It captures some aspects of happening, such as
object motion and ordinal temporal relations.
6. Holding information. The perceived present is a store of
information with a duration that is variable up to a max-
imum of about 100 ms.
7. Incorporation of semantic information. Two examples
are information about emotional expression in faces
(e.g., Kiss & Eimer, 2008) and information about unob-
servable kinetic variables such as force, mass, and cau-
sality in perception of objects moving and interacting
(White, 2009, 2012). The information in the perceived
present clearly goes beyond superficial physical
features.
8. Time marking. Information in the present is information-
ally marked as “now”, and other kinds of time markers,
including ordinality, temporal interval, and duration, al-
so occur.
9. Information in the perceived present may be accessed by
other processes (e.g. read-off mechanisms, automatic
perceptual learning processes) and may be transferred
to sensory memory or working memory, but is subject
to rapid decay from its initial high capacity to the initial
capacity of sensory memory.
10. Continuity in the waking state. The perceived present
goes on all the time, at least in the waking state.
The perceived present is, perhaps, the ultimate illusion—
the use of informational markers to generate the impression
that we perceive what is going on now, when, in fact, percep-
tual processing latencies entail that this is not the case.
This summary helps to show how the perceived present
differs from visible persistence, which is a local phenomenon
of early visual processing prior to incorporation of semantic
information (Coltheart, 1980). The 10 features listed above are
not necessary, and it is possible to imagine a perceived present
different in almost every respect: one that represented purely
superficial features of objects, such as shape and luminance,
without semantic information, or one that had a longer holding
time, as in akinetopsia. The features in the list certainly are not
features of the hypothetical present moment in physics, which
has a temporal resolution on the Planck time scale, lacks se-
mantic information, and has coherence that is bestowed on it
by the laws of physics, not by information processing. The
particular features of the perceived present must speak to the
functions that it has: different functions would require or fa-
vour different features.
Conclusion
The perceived present is an important but neglected research
topic. Those who research perceptual processing are con-
cerned with things that go on before information enters the
perceived present; those who research memory, from sensory
memory on, are concerned with what happens to information
after it leaves the perceived present. Those who research
topics related to consciousness such as the time to emergence
of conscious percepts are concerned with a problem that is, at
most, only a part of what matters about the perceived present.
The perceived present itself, as an information structure, has
been neglected. By showing that it has informational features
that do not correspond to features of the hypothetical present
moment of physics, and by considering hypotheses about its
functional significance, I hope to have shown that studying the
perceived present is important to a full understanding of the
long and complex stream of perceptual and memorial
processing.
Something is registered as being in the past, not because it
is, but because it is timemarked as being in the past. It must be
the same for the present: that is how past and present are
differentiated in perception and memory. Time is never direct-
ly experienced. All experience of time is in the form of time
markers that temporally differentiate perceptual information
in various ways.
There is clearly a need for research focussed on the per-
ceived present and its properties. Those who have postulated
frames of conscious perception are among the few who have
attempted that: A frame has the explanatory advantage that
information in a given frame is held without change for the
time span of the frame. However, the evidence for frames is
not compelling (White, 2018), and there is much about the
process of frame construction that is not understood.
Piecemeal updating of the perceived present is a viable
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alternative, but there is still a need for a mechanism for hold-
ing information for the duration of the perceived present. At
least the debate between frames and piecemeal updating is
broaching the problem of the perceived present from one
direction, and the studies by Jacob et al. (2013) and Öğmen
et al. (2013) have made a start on investigating the properties
of the perceived present by looking at build-up and decay of
information on short time scales. Hopefully, these lines of
research can be further developed into a more complete body
of research on the problem.
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